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This paper examines the claim that de Finetti and Savage completely rejected the notion of 
indeterminate, as distinct from imprecise, probabilities. It argues that their examination of imprecise 
reasoning  refers both to descriptive and normative issues, and that the inability for a decision-
maker to commit to a single prior cannot be limited to measurement problems, as argued by 
Arthmar and Brady in a recent contribution to this Journal. The paper shows that de Finetti and 
Savage admitted that having an interval of initial probabilities may sometimes have normative 
relevance, thereby leaving an opening for indeterminate probabilities. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Bruno de Finetti is famous for the uncompromising purism with which he advocated subjectivist-
Bayesianism, for being a «Radical Probabilist» par excellence as he was affectionately remembered 
at the 2006 conference marking the centenary of his birth (Galavotti 2009). This reputation stems 
from his strong denial of any role for objective elements in both the theory and the practice of 
statistics (Jeffrey 1989).  De Finetti’s position in this respect, already evident in his very early work 
(de Finetti 1930, 1931) was unwavering over the length of his career: more than forty years after 
starting out he would open his magnum opus, Theory of Probability, with the iconic phrase 
«Probability does not exist» (de Finetti 1974, x). 
 De Finetti’s operational definition of probability reflects the same uncompromising spirit. In 
his theory, probability is defined in terms of betting quotients, derived as the ratio between the sum 
of money an individual would be willing to bet on the occurrence of a certain event in exchange for 
a given prize, and the prize itself. Under the assumption that the individual is obliged to bet either 
on the event or its opposite, a sharp numerical probability can be derived for any event (de Finetti 
1937). Indeed, all subjective probabilities become numerically definite by definition from a strictly 
subjectivist viewpoint. Moreover, this notion of probability is intended as an instrument for making 
choices under uncertainty, applicable to choices related to any kind of event, from the spin of a 
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roulette wheel to the outcome of a horse race. All uncertainties become measurable, on this view, 
thereby obviating the need to distinguish between risky and uncertain situations, regardless of 
claims to the contrary by economists such as Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921). The clarity and 
forcefulness with which de Finetti stated this position did much to make it the basis of the new 
Bayesian mainstream, as represented by Leonard Savage’s (1972 [1954]) axiomatic system. 
 Viewed in this light, the possibility that there may be room for imprecision in probabilistic 
reasoning after all in de Finetti’s theoretical construct, and in particular in its development and 
defence pursued jointly with Savage, is therefore an intriguing one. We examined this possibility in 
Feduzi et al. (2012) and showed that there is evidence in de Finetti’s work that suggests that he was 
more receptive to a distinction between risk and uncertainty than is usually admitted. To be sure, he 
rejected Knight’s sharp distinction between probabilistically measurable risk and unmeasurable 
uncertainty. But his 1967 study of the application of the economics of uncertainty to insurance, yet 
to be translated from the original Italian, suggests a theoretical case for uncertainty even when 
individuals are endowed with sharp subjective probabilities. Indeed, de Finetti (1967a, 36-38) 
conceded that Knight’s distinction may become relevant when different individuals «sensibly 
disagree» on the probability of the occurrence of an event, with «risks» corresponding to cases in 
which one finds only minor discrepancies in valuations made by different individuals—which is 
«what renders them insurable».1 He was thus led to suggest that a situation of uncertainty might be 
conceived as one in which individuals’ opinions about the probability of the occurrence of a given 
event «sensibly differ», and which, contrary to the predictions of the standard model of risk 
exchange inspired by the subjectivist treatment of uncertainty (Borch 1967), may lead insurance 
markets to fail even where individuals are able to attach sharp numerical probabilities to the 
contingencies concerned.2 
 The question that then arises is what this admission says about de Finetti’s views on the 
foundations of probability. Is there any evidence to suggest that he might have been less stringent a  
Bayesian with respect to specific cases coloured by ambiguity? Might the differences of opinion 
admitted with respect to a group of individuals represent the epistemic state of a single individual, 
                                                 
1 Quotations from de Finetti’s works unavailable in English are translated from the original Italian 
by the authors, including passages attributed to Savage in DE FINETTI AND SAVAGE (1962). 
2 DE FINETTI (1967a, 37) suggests that the degree of difference between individuals’ subjective 
probabilities depends on the particular circumstances under which those judgements are elicited. 
He is therefore sceptical of attempts to draw a clear line between cases in which there is perfect 
uniformity of judgements and cases in which there is not, and rejects Knight’s terminology on 
the grounds that it may give the impression that the boundary between risk and uncertainty is 
clear-cut rather than fuzzy.    
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possibly in very special instances, but be of theoretical interest? Our claim in Feduzi et al. (2014) is 
that de Finetti’s largely unnoticed positive attitude towards instances of uncertainty indicates a more 
favourable view of imprecise reasoning than is usually recognised. To show this, we concentrated 
mainly on his collaboration with Savage, which occurred at a stage when even some of their 
subjectivist colleagues were voicing reservations about the subjectivist view in decision theory 
(Ellsberg 1961, Fellner 1961) and statistics (Smith 1961). Focusing mostly on de Finetti and 
Savage’s assessment of Cedric Smith’s foundational paper of the statistical approach to 
approximate reasoning (Walley 1991), we attempted  to show that the way de Finetti defended his 
position against Smith’s demonstration that interval-valued probabilities may be derived from 
choice behaviour—Smith following de Finetti himself in the adoption of an operational 
perspective—amount to more than a mere acceptance of the existence of descriptive violations of 
what is intended as a normative standard. That is to say, rather than interpreting imprecision as 
nothing more than an empirical violation of Bayesian rationality, one that does not disturb—indeed 
justifies—the theory as a normative tool, de Finetti and Savage admit that imprecise reasoning may 
sometimes be acceptable even from a normative perspective. 
 Our assessment of the subtleties of de Finetti’s understanding of uncertainty was recently 
criticized in this Journal by Arthmar and Brady, who claim that we overlook the important 
distinction between imprecise and indeterminate probabilities. Since we disregarded this difference, 
according to Arthmar and Brady (2016, 107), we failed to see an important difference between de 
Finetti and Savage «who completely discard the concept of indeterminate probabilities», and 
Keynes and Knight who reserved a place for indeterminacy as well as imprecision in probability 
and decision-making. The difference between imprecise and indeterminate probabilities may be 
described as follows. Following Levi (1985, 392), a probabilistic assessment does not conform to a 
«strict Bayesian viewpoint» when in an otherwise subjective framework, «rational agents often do 
not and should not regard exactly one real-valued probability function to be permissible for use in 
assessing expected utilities». Strict Bayesians allow that «human agents … ought not to be expected 
to be able to identify their strictly Bayesian credal probability judgements with full numerical 
precision», but regard this as an issue of imprecise probability priors stemming from measurement 
problems. Measurement problems may be relevant in practice for an actual decision-maker who 
cannot see with clarity the details of a decision problem, but do not bother a rational decision-maker 
who cannot suffer permanent lack of information. In contrast, indeterminate probability priors arise 
when it is «rational to make no determinate probability judgement» and where a refusal to do so 
may derive from «a very clear and cool judgment that on the basis of the available evidence, 
making a numerically determinate judgment would be unwarranted and arbitrary» (Levi 1985, 396). 
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 In spite of their differences in other respects, writers such as Koopman (1940), Good (1952), 
Smith (1961), all explore the possibility of using sets of probability priors or upper and lower 
probability functions for a systematic characterization of degrees of belief. More generally, and 
whether they were conscious of this or not, authors using a less strict Bayesian approach were 
working in the footstep of Keynes (1921), who associated uncertainty with indeterminate, as 
opposed to imprecise, probability judgements, and Knight (1921), who saw uncertainty as 
something not representable through probabilities. In contrast, de Finetti and Savage, were 
committed to characterizing degrees of belief by way of single probability priors, in a subjectivist 
set-up that, as we have already noted, was intended to transform uncertainty into numerically 
definite subjective probabilities. Thus, Arthmar and Brady argue, any concession by de Finetti and 
Savage with respect to a decision-maker not being prepared to commit to a single prior must be 
interpreted as admitting imprecision, something a rational decision maker would eventually rectify 
via updating, rather than indeterminacy.  
Our aim in this paper is to respond to Arthmar and Brady by arguing that they fail to 
appreciate the importance in our account of the difference between the descriptive and the 
normative in probabilistic reasoning, and how this difference relates to peoples’ position on 
imprecise versus indeterminate probability. The claim that de Finetti and Savage completely 
rejected the notion of indeterminate probabilities can be dismissed on the basis of the normative 
value they attributed to Smith’s considerations, in our view, regardless of an explicit account of the 
distinction between imprecise and indeterminate probabilities.3 
 
2. DE FINETTI AND SAVAGE’S REACTION TO SMITH 
As author of the first comprehensive presentation of what came to be known as the Bayesian 
approach to decision-making and statistics, Savage became widely regarded as its champion. But 
while Savage’s approach was enthusiastically endorsed by decision theorists (Luce and Raiffa 1957, 
Arrow 1958), the response from statisticians was not encouraging (Wallis 1981). For instance, the 
discussion following Savage’s presentation of the Bayesian viewpoint at the Joint Statistics Seminar 
at Birkbeck and Imperial Colleges in London in 1959 reflects the fierce opposition to his ideas 
among a vast majority of frequentist statisticians (Savage 1962a). Savage nevertheless found a 
major ally in de Finetti, in his quest to promote a paradigmatic shift in statistics, who he recognized 
                                                 
3  VICIG AND SEIDENFELD (2012) anticipate Arthmar and Brady’s views in many respects, and note 
that fundamental contributions made by de Finetti—especially coherence of subjective 
probabilities and exchangeability of random variables—form part of an active imprecise 
probability research agenda in statistics. But they maintain that he personally ignored the 
possibilities of using it to analyse uncertainty.  
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as a major source of inspiration (Savage 1972 [1954], 4). De Finetti and Savage stayed in close and 
constant contact in those years, and their agreement on almost all issues was so profound that it is 
difficult to find notable differences between the two when they corresponded about their critics. In 
the early 1960s, then, the historical background was one that saw de Finetti and Savage focused on 
showing how the subjective probability approach could foster the spread of new statistical tools and 
operational methods for inference, all in a hostile environment in the statistical arena (Fienberg 
2006). 
 However, the subjectivist approach was also suffering friendly fire at the time. Ellsberg 
(1961) and Fellner (1961), both declared subjectivists, questioned Savage’s probability approach, 
on the grounds that it was not rich enough to deal with many instances of actual decision 
environments, and that the way it allowed decision-making under uncertainty to be subsumed into 
the framework von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) had devised for risk was unwarranted. 
Moreover, one of the very few English statisticians committed to the subjectivist approach, Cedric 
Smith, advanced a similar criticism. Smith presented the need to fix initial probabilities as an 
obvious precondition for the application of Bayesian methodology, but investigated the possibility 
that personal probabilities are not necessarily sharp, presenting his work as a generalization of 
Savage’s subjective approach that admitted imprecision. Smith measured «imprecise» beliefs by 
means of betting quotients arguing that to be prepared to bet on an event at a certain maximum price 
does not equate to being prepared to bet against it at an infinitesimally higher one. Personal betting 
quotients could then be interpreted as upper and lower probabilities and the person be attributed an 
interval of initial probabilities. The fact that he adopted an operational perspective a la de Finetti 
made it necessary for de Finetti and Savage to comment on it.4 
 As noted in Feduzi et al. (2014), de Finetti’s position on interval-valued probabilities is best 
reflected in his 1962 joint paper with Savage called «Sul modo di scegliere le probabilità iniziali» 
(«How to choose the initial probabilities»). This paper, which presents the subjectivist justification 
for the use of initial probabilities and clarifies the meaning of fixing such probabilities arbitrarily, is 
notable because it includes an entire section on the relevance of Smith’s contribution to the 
development of Bayesian statistics. An introductory note explains that this section was added in 
September 1961, while the main part had already being drafted following a sabbatical Savage spent 
                                                 
4 SMITH (1965, 478) illustrated his viewpoint as follows: «if I am willing to bet 2 to 1 on sun 
against rain, and 1 to 4 on rain against sun, this means that I regard sun as between 2 and 4 times 
as probable as rain; and I do not need to be more precise than this». As a result the elicitation of 
probabilities from choices entails that «probabilities and utilities are no longer uniquely defined, 
but, in accordance with human vagueness and imprecision, they are only determined within a 
certain range». 
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in Rome in 1959. Concentrating on this 1961 addition makes it possible to see how de Finetti and 
Savage reacted to criticism emanating from within the subjectivist camp.5 
 The paper discusses a number of foundational issues, including whether «inexactly 
determined» and «fuzzy» initial opinions can be expressed through an exact probability value. It 
turns out that some tension emerges between the strict subjective interpretation and de Finetti’s 
further elaboration with Savage on this point. On the one hand, the idea that there can be no exact 
knowledge of initial probabilities is taken to be «meaningless» (de Finetti and Savage 1962, 94) and 
claims to the effect that exact probabilities can be replaced by probability intervals are described in 
the English summary as posing «more severe problems that they are intended to resolve» as they 
entail the identification of precise upper and lower values (Savage 1962b, 150).6 On the other hand, 
in a paragraph added in the final draft of the paper, de Finetti and Savage admit that, «it is often 
practically impossible to anyone to state that … the probability which he can attribute to a certain 
event has a precise value» (de Finetti and Savage 1962, 95). 
 This passage alludes to more than measurement problems, however, because it reflects 
Savage’s apparent concern about suggesting a version of Bayesianism that was simply too 
demanding. Added in the 1961 version of the paper—which reproduces part of the correspondence 
between the two authors ensuing from the preliminary draft, with each author speaking for 
himself—is Savage’s claim that: 
we seem to argue [in the preliminary draft] that imprecision in probability judgements can be 
always removed, after providing enough effort … [but] this conclusion is not in harmony with my 
experience and introspection. 
 
Savage finds it difficult to insist on numerical precision «with respect to many highly relevant and 
concerning events», for instance, the «probability of a world war in a near future» (de Finetti and 
Savage, 130). The initial probability may be impossible to make precise in this instance: 
Of course there exist a great many data relevant to this event, that I could gather and arrange, and 
also important ways in which I could arrange my thoughts on these, but I could not hope 
nonetheless that the result of my efforts could entail a probability. 
 
And he (de Finetti and Savage 1962, 131) concludes: 
                                                 
5  The paper has never been translated in English but is known in the statistical literature courtesy 
of a long English summary by SAVAGE (1962b). Savage’s English summary, though, appears to 
have been written after the first draft was completed, and does not include reference to the 
additional section on imprecision. The English summary is therefore missing a crucial part of the 
story. 
6 Later, DE FINETTI (1974, 334) made his point as follows: «That an evaluation of probability often 
appears to us more or less vague cannot be denied; it seems even more imprecise, however (as 
well as devoid of any real meaning), to specify the limits of this uncertainty». 
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Specifically, I maintain that our current effort is devoted to contrast some of the difficulties related 
to the phenomenon of vagueness and imprecision, and, though we can make something to overcome 
this difficulty, I do not think we can pretend to eliminate it completely.7 
  
De Finetti seems to be the more cautious of the two authors, but he (de Finetti and Savage 1962, 
131) agrees that: 
we do not really claim that we can seriously attribute a precise value to every probability … but 
only that it can often be done with adequate approximation ... and most of all that if this is not 
enough it cannot be for any other decision method as well. 
 
The conclusion thus seems to be that the descriptive issue is more relevant than previously 
admitted: even though imprecision «is not something on which one can meaningfully theorise», it 
can constitute an «actual epistemic state» of the individual facing uncertainty, whose nature is 
«difficult to be made precise in a convincing manner» (de Finetti and Savage 1962, 133-134).  
 It should be remembered that, when introducing his axiomatic structure for decision-making 
under uncertainty, Savage (1972 [1954], 16) distinguished a «small» world, in which he considered 
his theory genuinely valid, and a «grand» world, in which not all the pay-off relevant events can be 
enumerated beforehand so that one should better «cross that bridge when you come to it». Before 
concentrating on small worlds, he rejected the idea that all worlds can be treated as small as 
«ridiculous». As noted by Binmore (2009), Savage’s small/grand distinction delineates a field of 
application of his theory that resembles the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
Moreover, Savage’s reaction to the Ellsberg Paradox was not as direct as that to the Allais Paradox, 
when he reacted to his failure to obey his own axioms in Allais’s test by claiming that, on reflection, 
he would have reversed his preferences (Savage 1972 [1954], 103). Savage was reported to be 
among deliberate violators of his own axioms when confronting Ellsberg’s urns (Ellsberg 1961, 
656), but there is no evidence in any of his publications that he changed his mind about the 
significance of his violation. And he did not appear to object to Ellsberg’s and Fellner’s argument 
about the normative relevance of vagueness in probability judgements, commenting only that: 
«some have tried to reflect the phenomenon of vagueness within the theory, while others believe 
                                                 
7  Savage here seems to be referring to updating that does not lead to sharp probability judgements. 
In their comment on our paper, Arthmar and Brady take a different view and claim instead that 
de Finetti and Savage regarded any indecision in attributing an initial probability as being limited 
to the very initial stage of Bayesian analysis, to be solved by updating. They also claim that this 
is not so in Keynes’s probability theory. These are larger issues than cannot be dealt with here, 
not least because we find difficult to make general claims about updating in Keynes’s theory. 
But even leaving aside the noted subtleties in Savage’s position, it is worth remembering that 
there is no evidence that Keynes was critical of Bayes in his Treatise on Probability and that de 
Finetti’s only detailed comment on Keynes’s Treatise is highly appreciative of Keynes’s theory 
of induction (DE FINETTI 1985 [1938], 84-85). 
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that, though vagueness must somehow be reckoned with, its nature defies formalization» (Savage 
1967, 308). Savage’s claim from the 1962 paper reported above, then, seems difficult to reconcile 
with the idea that he and de Finetti followed Ramsey in viewing «uncertainty as being strictly a 
measurement error problem», as claimed by Arthmar and Brady (2016, 110, emphasis added). 
 What is more, in its treatment of Smith’s contribution, the 1962 paper signals de Finetti and 
Savage’s normative doubts about the assumption of sharp priors (Feduzi et al. 2014, 16-18). As just 
noted, Smith worked with interval-valued probabilities, but, differently from Keynes, Koopman and 
Good, did not interpret probabilities as intuitive judgements. Rather, he adopted an operational 
perspective. Also he showed how the fundamental principles of avoiding sure loss and coherence 
could be applied to the axiomatic context of interval-valued probabilities (Walley 1991). In the 
additional sections devoted to Smith’s «particularly elaborate analysis» of Koopman’s and Good’s 
idea «to make imprecision precise», de Finetti and Savage (1962, 133) admit that Smith’s approach 
provides an operational criterion to precisely determine the two limiting lower and upper 
probability values: «in Smith’s case», they concede, «… the objections about the precision of the 
extreme values do not hold» (de Finetti and Savage 1962, 135). This concession contradicts what 
they claimed before and, significantly, what the English summary reports. But de Finetti and 
Savage also make a specific concession with regard to the normative justification of imprecise 
reasoning, presenting an important case in which they accept Smith’s argument. Smith’s 
considerations are said to «express what can be said of a certain behaviour when one has an 
incomplete knowledge of the opinions justifying a decision». Sounding as if they are trying to make 
up their own mind, de Finetti and Savage (de Finetti and Savage 1962, 141-142) go on: while «an 
opinion implying an indeterminate probability concerning a certain event is not admissible», it may 
be possible: 
to know imperfectly an opinion, and thus to be capable of identifying only partially the preferences 
which the opinion implies (in a complete manner) among alternative possible decisions. 
 
 The implication is that Smith’s approach may be of help in cases in which one has «partial 
knowledge of a preference» so that the probability of an event can be said to be indeterminate. 
While de Finetti and Savage did not offer generalizations of philosophical interest on this issue, 
they (1962, 142) do provide an example in order to illustrate their point, that is, the case of a single 
individual who experiences a «kind of personality dissociation … as indicated also by Smith». They 
see this case as representing the situation of an individual who has «various souls leaning towards 
contrasting opinions», possibly because they are in doubt about whether to rely on their own sharp 
prior or on ones they have been made aware by consulting experts they respect. De Finetti and 
Savage admit that what is obvious for group decision-making even in a strictly Bayesian set-up—
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with the sharp probability priors of each individual generally diverging one from the other (de 
Finetti 1955)—could be ascribed to a single individual who, due to conflicting evidence, such as 
diverging experts’ opinions, is endowed with a set of probability priors.  
 Situations of conflicting evidence are of course quite common in practical decision 
situations, but what matters for our assessment is that it is not clear that admitting their relevance 
for decision-making should be considered a failure of rationality. For sure, it amounts to a failure of 
strict Bayesian rationality, but not of the Bayesian viewpoint in general and of Keynes’s view in the 
Treatise on Probability.8 Indeed, this was the point made by Ellsberg in his critique of Savage. 
Even simple urn examples, not necessarily complex real life situations such as the uncertainty 
concerning «a world war in the near future», showed that many individuals fail to conform to strict 
Bayesian rationality even after thorough consideration of Savage’s axioms, and that this might be a 
problem with the normative strictures of the theory rather than any shortcomings in the reasoning of 
the individuals concerned (Ellsberg 1961, 660-661). Probabilities are indeterminate, in such 
instances as a result of what Levi above calls «a very clear and cool judgement». It is also worth 
noting that when distinguishing between imprecise probabilities generated either by indeterminacy 
of beliefs or incompleteness due to difficulties in assessment, Peter Walley (1991, 214), possibly 
the major contributor to the development of imprecise reasoning in statistics, lists conflict between 
expert opinions as a notable example of «imprecision [that] reflects unavoidable indeterminacy 
rather than incomplete modelling». 
 A crucial part of the evidence for our argument that de Finetti and Savage’s concession to 
Smith had normative significance is the rarely mentioned taxonomy of probability theories created 
                                                 
8   ARTHMAR AND BRADY (2016, 107) maintain that «what Feduzi et al. call Keynes’s ‘non-
numerical’ probabilities are actually Keynes’s interval-valued probability estimates», and mildly 
take us to task for seeming «oblivious to the Boolean framework used by Keynes in the TP» 
(which informed the interval-valued approach laid out in Chapter 15 of that book). However 
some of us had noted in earlier work the place Keynes reserves for interval-valued probabilities 
in Chapter 15 of a Treatise on Probability (RUNDE 1994a; 1994b, BASILI AND ZAPPIA 2009, 
ZAPPIA 2015) and, albeit admittedly without making explicit links to Chapter 15 of A Treatise in 
Probability or Boole himself, have all written at length on interval-valued probability in various 
papers on Keynesian uncertainty (both in the papers Arthmar and Brady reference (FEDUZI ET AL. 
2012, 2014) and also in RUNDE (2001) and FEDUZI AND RUNDE (2011)). For our part, we agree 
with Arthmar and Brady that there is considerable continuity between Keynes’s earlier views on 
probability and parts of his later economic writings on the nature and effects of uncertainty, and 
we see their emphasis on the theme of interval-valued probabilities as an important corrective to 
the literature on Keynesian uncertainty in which it is generally ignored (BRADY AND ARTHMAR 
2012). But we would part ways on their broad characterisation of a Treatise on Probability as an 
«interval-valued theory of probability». We do so because we feel is misleading for his whole 
theory being characterised in terms of what is an adjunct to it, a method of approximation which, 
in KEYNES’s (1973 [1921], 177, emphasis added) own words, «may occasionally be useful».  
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by de Finetti (1967b) for an entry on the theory of probability in the International Encyclopaedia of 
Social Sciences. As we noted in Feduzi et al. (2014), de Finetti divides philosophical interpretations 
of probability into objective and subjective approaches. Subjective theories are classified under the 
headings of «psychological», «consistent» and «rational» with respect to the behaviour under 
uncertainty they intend to examine (de Finetti 1967b, 499-501). While the consistent subjective 
probability theory branch includes Ramsey, Savage and de Finetti himself, and the rational branch 
comprises the logical approach of Keynes and Jeffreys, psychological theories are not linked 
explicitly to any author. De Finetti argues that the psychological subjective theory of probability 
emerges from then recent experimental studies of the actual behaviour of individuals under 
uncertainty, but makes it clear that actual behaviour that diverges from coherent behaviour cannot 
be used to object to normative theories, since normative theories like the subjective and rational 
variants are intended to state «what behaviour is good or bad», irrespective of the actual behaviour 
examined in psychological theories (de Finetti 1967b, 500). De Finetti then goes on to acknowledge 
that some theories do not quite fit his scheme, particularly because of their insistence on 
probabilities that «may be noncomparable, and hence nonnumerical». He mentions Ellsberg as a 
variant of subjective psychological theories that permits non-comparability, and which, as a 
psychological theory, he dismisses as a possible counterexample to a normative theory. Crucially, 
however, he classifies Smith’s interval-valued probabilities approach as a variant of the subjective 
consistent kind, thereby bringing Smith’s representation of non-comparability into the fold of 
normative theories. By separating Smith from psychological studies, in other words, de Finetti takes 
a clear step towards acknowledging the issue of indeterminacy and admitting potential normative 
status for theories allowing for interval-valued probability priors.9 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to what one would expect from an orthodox proponent of the subjectivist-Bayesian 
approach, de Finetti’s rejection of interval-valued probabilities needs to be qualified. His 
collaboration with Savage in the 1960s amounts to a joint effort aimed at both clarifying the 
relevance of their viewpoint for statistical analysis and accounting for the criticism coming from 
adherents to their subjectivist viewpoint. In their reflection on Smith, de Finetti and Savage refer to 
                                                 
9  The final draft of the de Finetti’s entry had been circulated already in 1963 on the suggestion of 
Savage, who edited it extensively. Savage was accustomed to translating parts of de Finetti’s 
work from the Italian for circulation among English speaking colleagues. In the 1960s he edited 
the translation of every work by de Finetti, including the 1964 translation by Kyburg of the 
famed 1937 foundational paper. In the editing of DE FINETTI (1967b) there is no objection to the 
choice to put Smith among consistent probability theories.  
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both descriptive and normative issues. They clearly acknowledge that the assumption of precise 
numerical probabilities often fails descriptively, thereby admitting imprecision as noted by Arthmar 
and Brady in their contribution to this Journal. But de Finetti and Savage also suggest that an 
individual’s inability to commit to a single prior may sometimes be acceptable even from a 
normative point of view, thereby, and contrary to what Arthmar and Brady argue, leaving an 
opening for indeterminate probabilities. 
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